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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Wayne D. Anderson, " pleaded guilty to felony 
lewd conduct with a child under sixteen. He subsequently filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 
33(c) motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the district court denied. Mr. Anderson 
then filed a motion to reconsider the district court's order denying the withdrawal of his 
guilty plea, which the district court also denied. The district court imposed a unified 
sentence of forty years, with fifteen years fixed. 
Mr. Anderson appealed, asserting that the district court abused its discretion 
when it did not permit him to withdraw his guilty plea. He also asserted that the district 
court abused its discretion when it imposed the sentence. 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State contends that the district court acted within its 
discretion when it denied Mr. Anderson's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and that 
Mr. Anderson failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion. 
(Resp. Br., pp.5-12.) 
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's contention that the district 
court acted within its discretion when it denied the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. 
Mr. Anderson asserts that the State has failed to establish that the district court acted 
within its discretion when it denied the withdrawal motion. Mr. Anderson showed that a 
just reason existed to withdraw his guilty plea. 
This Reply Brief is also necessary to inform this Court that Mr. Anderson is 
withdrawing his assertion that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed 
the sentence, and thus is no longer challenging his sentence in this appeal. 
1 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Anderson's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
2 
ISSUE 
Has the State failed to establish that the district court acted within its discretion when it 
denied Mr. Anderson's motion to withdraw his guilty plea? 
3 
ARGUMENT 
The State Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Acted Within Its Discretion 
When It Denied Mr. Anderson's Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Plea 
The State argues that the district court acted within its discretion in denying 
Mr. Anderson's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (Resp. Sr., p.6.) U[T]he district court 
correctly rejected [Mr.] Anderson's contention that family pressure and depression 
rendered his guilty plea constitutionally involuntary. It also properly utilized its discretion 
in determining that these factors did not otherwise constitute just cause for the 
withdrawal of his plea." (Resp. Sr., p.6 (citation omitted).) 
Mr. Anderson asserts that the State has failed to establish that the district court 
acted within its discretion when it denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. A 
district court should permit the pre-sentence withdrawal of a guilty plea if a just reason 
exists for withdrawing the plea, and if withdrawing the plea would not prejudice the 
State. State v. Hans/ovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535-36 (Ct. App. 2008). Mr. Anderson has 
shown that a just reason existed to withdraw his guilty plea. Additionally, the State has 
effectively conceded that permitting Mr. Anderson to withdraw his plea would not have 
prejudiced the State. 
The State argues that a just reason did not exist to withdraw Mr. Anderson's 
plea, because "the district court correctly rejected [Mr.] Anderson's contention that 
family pressure and depression rendered his guilty plea constitutionally involuntary," 
and the district court "also properly utilized its discretion in determining that these 
factors did not otherwise constitute just cause for the withdrawal of the pieR" (Resp. 
Sr., pp.6-7.) While the State recognizes that Mr. Anderson has asserted that the 
combination of family pressure and severe depression provided a just reason to 
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withdraw the plea, the State proceeds to argue that family pressure and severe 
depression, taken individually, did not render Mr. Anderson's plea involuntary or 
otherwise provide a just reason for withdrawing the plea. (See Resp. Br., pp.7-9.) 
However, Mr. Anderson does not assert that family pressure or severe 
depression alone provided a just reason for withdrawing his guilty plea. Rather, the 
combination of those two factors provided the requisite just reason. Thus, Mr. Anderson 
has shown that the just reason for withdrawing the plea existed. 
The State argues that Mr. Anderson's "change of plea hearing contained a 
lengthy plea colloquy designed to ensure the voluntariness of the plea," that 
Mr. Anderson during the plea colloquy did not indicate that he had been induced to 
plead guilty, and that Mr. Anderson in the written guilty plea advisory form indicated that 
there was no reason he would be unable to make reasoned and informed decisions. 
(Resp. Br., pp.7-8.) However, the plea colloquy and Mr. Anderson's representations 
during the plea agreement process are not dispositive as to the voluntariness of his 
guilty plea. "On appeal, Idaho law requires that voluntariness of the guilty plea and 
waiver must be reasonably inferred from the record as a whole." State v. Dopp, 124 
Idaho 481, 484 (1993). Mr. Anderson asserts that, based on the record as a whole, the 
combination of family pressure and severe depression (despite the plea colloquy and 
his related representations) rendered his guilty plea involuntary. 
Additionally, the State argues that, while Mr. Anderson "alleged that he was 
hospitalized in a mental facility for three days following a suicide attempt shortly prior to 
his arrest, he has not demonstrated that any mental health issue compromised the 
voluntariness of his guilty plea six months later." (Resp. Br., p.8.) The State also 
5 
essentially argues that Mr. Anderson did not suffer from "depression." (See Resp. 
Br., p.8.) The record belies these arguments, because the combination of family 
pressure and severe depression reached a critical stage right before Mr. Anderson 
entered his guilty plea. 
During a video/phone conversation Mr. Anderson had with his wife in the days 
before he entered his guilty plea, she told him that he had the choice either "to fix it and 
make it right," or "to further victimize your daughters." (Joint Ex. 1, Disc 1, 22:05 -
22:25.) Mr. Anderson stated that he was "fighting for my life." (Joint Ex. 1, Disc 1, 
10:05 - 10:15, 27:55 - 28:05.) Mrs. Anderson told Mr. Anderson to "stop fighting." 
(Joint Ex. 1, Disc 1,28:20 - 28:30.) 
Thus, in his affidavit filed in support of the motion to withdraw his guilty plea, 
Mr. Anderson stated that during the video/phone conversation, "my wife told me to 'stop 
trying to save my life' and that I was harming our children. She also made it absolutely 
clear that she wanted me to plead guilty." (R, p.91.) Mr. Anderson stated: "As a result 
of hearing my wife tell me that she did not want me to live anymore, I was completely 
devastated mentally and emotionally." (R, p.91.) He entered his guilty plea in the next 
couple days.1 (R, p.92; Tr., Apr. 16,2012, p.2, L.16 - p.3, L.16.) 
Although Mr. Anderson has not been formally diagnosed with depression, he 
nonetheless indicated that he was suffering from severe depression right before and at 
the time he entered his guilty plea. In his motion to reconsider the district court's order 
1 While Mr. Anderson stated in the affidavit that he entered his guilty plea the day after 
he video/phone conversation with his wife (R, pp.91-92), the statements by his trial 
counsel to the district court indicate that the conversation occurred two days before the 
plea was entered (see Tr., Apr. 16,2012, p.2, L.7 - p.3, L.16). 
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denying the withdrawal of his guilty plea, Mr. Anderson averred that "he was severely 
depressed after talking to his wife" the day of the video/phone conversation. 
(R., p.1 05.) He also averred that "he was still depressed" when he entered his guilty 
plea in the next couple days. (R., p.106.) Further, Mr. Anderson's counsel told the 
district court that after Mrs. Anderson told Mr. Anderson to plead guilty, "[i]t increased 
his depression." (Tr., July 16, 2012, p.5, Ls.11-12.) 
In sum, the combination of family pressure and severe depression reached a 
critical stage right before Mr. Anderson entered his guilty plea. This combination 
affected Mr. Anderson's guilty plea. As Mr. Anderson wrote in his affidavit, "At the time 
of entering my plea, I was still distraught about what my wife had told me the day 
before." (R., p.92.) His plea was entered "while under the influence of the pain and 
grief caused by what my wife had said to me." (R., p.92.) Thus, the State's arguments 
that Mr. Anderson did not demonstrate that any mental health issue compromised the 
voluntariness of his guilty plea and that he did not suffer from depression are unavailing. 
The State also argues, with regard to the family pressure exerted on 
Mr. Anderson by his wife, that "[a] family member's expression of her desire that a case 
be settled does not require a district court to exercise its discretion in favor of granting a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea." (Resp. Sr., p.9.) Further, the State argues that "the 
written and recorded communications between [Mr.] Anderson and his wife ... do not 
reveal any overbearing influence by [Mr.] Anderson's wife on [Mr.] Anderson's decision-
making that would justify the withdrawal of his plea." (Resp. Sr., p.9.) Again, the State 
addresses the family pressure factor individually, while Mr. Anderson asserts that the 
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combination of family pressure and severe depression provided the requisite 
just reason. 
The record evidence also reveals that Mrs. Anderson exerted significant family 
pressure on Mr. Anderson. In his affidavit in support of the motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea, Mr. Anderson stated that his wife "is one of the few persons who can influence 
what I do or say and my decision-making processes," and that "I will do almost anything 
in order to fulfill the wishes of my wife." (R., p.91.) Mrs. Anderson had enough 
influence on Mr. Anderson to leave him "completely devastated mentally and 
emotionally" after their video/phone conversation. (R., p.91.) Mrs. Anderson's family 
pressure combined with Mr. Anderson's severe depression: as Mr. Anderson's trial 
counsel informed the district court, their conversation "increased his depression." 
(Tr., July 16, 2012, p.5, Ls.11-12.) Thus, the State has not invalidated the combination 
of family pressure and severe depression as a just reason for withdrawing the plea. 
The combination of family pressure and severe depression provided a just 
reason for withdrawing Mr. Anderson's guilty plea, because that combination rendered 
his guilty plea involuntary. See Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 536. Alternatively, under the 
liberal standard for granting the withdrawal of pleas prior to sentencing, the combination 
of family pressure and severe depression provided a just reason for withdrawing the 
plea even if the plea was not involuntary. See State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 298 
(1990); State v. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 957 (Ct. App. 1990). Thus, Mr. Anderson has 
shown that a just reason for withdrawing the plea existed. 
The State has presented no argument or authority against Mr. Anderson's 
assertion that withdrawing the plea would not have prejudiced the State. (See Resp. 
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Br., pp.6-12.) Thus, the State has effectively conceded that permitting Mr. Anderson to 
withdraw his plea would not have prejudiced the State. See State v. Stark, No. 39885, 
2013 WL 1338841, at *5 (Idaho Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2013), pet. for rev. granted (Idaho 
July 5, 2013). 
The district court should have permitted Mr. Anderson to withdraw his guilty plea, 
because a just reason for withdrawing the plea existed and withdrawing the plea would 
not have prejudiced the State. See Hans/ovan, 147 Idaho at 535-36. Thus, the State 
has failed to establish that the district court acted within its discretion when it denied 
Mr. Anderson's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Anderson respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of 
conviction and remand the case with direction to permit him to withdraw his plea of 
guilty. Because Mr. Anderson is withdrawing his assertion that the district court abused 
its discretion when it imposed the sentence, he no longer requests that this Court 
reduce his sentence. 
DATED this 6th day of August, 2013. 
17;' /) ~~ 
BE~/~~;CK ~GRE~ 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
9 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 6th day of August, 2013, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, by causing to be placed a 
copy thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to: 
WAYNE 0 ANDERSON" 
INMATE #103343 
ICC 
PO BOX 70010 
BOISE 1083707 
THOMAS J RYAN 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
MARKMIMURA 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
P.O. BOX 83720 
BOISE, 1083720-0010 
Hand delivered to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court. 
BPM/eas 
EVAN A. SMITH 
Administrative Assistant 
10 
